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Summary
Collaborative governance (CG) refers to a mode of policy and service delivery that shifts 
away from government- or market-centric settings to a setting in which public, private 
nonprofit, and private business actors are jointly involved in and accountable for 
policymaking and service delivery to create public value that could otherwise not be 
achieved. This mode has arisen as a result of societal issues’ becoming increasingly 
“wicked,” lacking consensus about what the exact nature of the problem is and what the 
appropriate solutions are (e.g., migration and refugees, climate change, poverty). These 
CG networks can often be fragmented and deprived of resources as part of increased 
fiscal stress, stimulating the search for cross-boundary arrangements for policy and 
management. Consequently, both practitioners and academics explore how more and 
better collaboration between semi-autonomous actors with different interests and 
resources can be achieved in efforts to tackle wicked issues. CG refers to a trend, an era, 
a practice, a paradigm, and a holistic framework. While there are variations in the way 
scholars conceptualize or define it as a model, some common features can be discerned. 
CG is about identifying/being aware of/dealing with the initial conditions of collaboration 
and the broader context or system in which cross-sectoral governance is situated. We 
seek ways of structuring and institutionalizing the collaboration in smart and effective 
ways that are deemed critical to achieving success and performance. The intentional and 
deliberative design and implementation of CG arrangements can result from deeper 
awareness of process and structure, as well as requiring active and smart management 
strategies and leadership roles to be used and played, while acknowledging the 
importance of being aware of downsides, risks, and constraints in doing so. Effective CG 
must be accountable, it must lead to public value and effective outcomes, and, in many 
countries, it must be democratically legitimate.
Keywords: collaboration, governance, networks, interorganizational relations, collaborative 
innovation, collaborative public management, public administration and policy
Subjects: Governance/Political Change
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The Emergence and Meaning of Collaborative Governance
In recent decades, the concept of collaborative governance (CG) has received much more 
attention, in part due to the desire to leverage partnerships within and across sectors to 
deliver public goods and services. Acknowledging the fuzziness of the concept and the variety 
of definitions and conceptualizations, this article begins with a general definition of how CG is 
usually understood in the public administration and management literature. Next, it discusses 
the context in which CG as a concept has gained increased importance in (the thinking about) 
public policymaking and public administration. Third, it tries to grasp the fuzziness of the 
concept by discussing three different and well-cited conceptualizations of CG. It finishes with 
issues to tackle in the theorizing about CG and gaps in our knowledge that warrant further 
research.
What Is CG?
CG is a successor to traditional public administration (i.e., the Weberian bureaucracy that 
delivers policies and services) and New Public Management (i.e., making government more 
businesslike and bringing in the market). CG is distinguished by a shift in policy and service 
delivery away from government- or market-centric settings to settings in which public, private 
nonprofit, and private business actors are jointly involved in and accountable for policymaking 
and service delivery, and in which private actors are considered as broadly as possible 
(companies, interest groups, volunteering organizations, citizens). So, rather than dealing 
with private actors through contracting out and economic or consumer logic, as is the case in 
New Public Management, the era of CG implies joint decision-making, implementation, and 
shared accountability across public, nonprofit, and private actors (Emerson & Nabatchi, 
2015). Drawing on Frederickson (2007), Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) discussed governance 
as “the act of governing, or how actors use processes and make decisions to exercise 
authority and control, grant power, take action, and ensure performance—all of which are 
guided by sets of principles, norms, roles, and procedures around which actors converge” (p. 
15). Bearing this definition of governance in mind, it is clear that CG is indeed one of the 
possible modes of governance, next to the hierarchical and market governance (Koliba et al., 
2019). As will be seen, CG unfolds within the context of networked relationships. In this view, 
networks are the structures through which CG unfolds. CG results from the processes 
employed through networks. Networks also support other “noncollaborative” functions, such 
as principal–agent, markets, and competition. Therefore, although not all network ties are 
collaborative, all collaborations are carried out through interactions between actors— 
essentially, nodes and edges of networks.
The Increasing Scientific Popularity of the CG Concept
CG as a major theoretical construct in public administration and management has gained 
broad prominence at increasing speed. A citation report search on “collaborative governance” 
in the Web of Science (WoS) Core Collection for the period 1955–2020 (generated on 
December 4, 2020) resulted in 1,067 records. The records were distributed in various WoS 
categories, but the bulk of them were cited in “Public Administration,” “Environmental 
Studies,” “Environmental Sciences,” “Political Science,” and “Management.” These findings 
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should come as no surprise, as the intentional use of cross-sector collaborations was first 
pioneered in environmental policy and management (Gerlak, 2006), as public-private– 
nonprofit partnerships were pursued to achieve environmental sustainability goals (Koontz et 
al., 2004).
The Drivers of CG
CG is a concept in which different streams of literature join up. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) 
traced the first use of the term “collaborative governance” to 1978, in the education literature 
that discussed new ways of teaching. However, the intellectual roots of CG can be traced 
much farther back in time. The literature on interorganizational relations grew out of both 
scholarship in organizational sociology, which sought to explore the strategic interactions 
between organizations and the social systems by which these interactions were governed (see 
Child et al., 1993; Friedberg & Crozier, 1980; Mayntz, 1993), and political science, where 
interest in the dispersion of power in pluralist and elitist systems (Dahl, 1961) grew into the 
analysis of the unequal distribution of power within interorganizational relationships (see 
Benson, 1982; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). In the field of public administration and 
management, this translated into research into how governments solved problems (or failed to 
do so) across organizations and levels, and how such networks are governed (see Hanf & 
Scharpf, 1978; Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn, 1996; Klijn et al., 1995). CG can be regarded as a 
subset of this broader literature on networks and interorganizational coordination.
The recent scientific popularity of the concept can be explained in several ways.
First, society is faced with complex new challenges that require new policies and adapted 
service delivery that cannot be tackled by government on its own (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn 
& Koppenjan, 2016). Many of these challenges can be framed as wicked problems or issues 
(Rittel & Webber, 1973): there often can be no clear agreement on the definition of the 
problem, nor what suitable and acceptable solutions might be, because they are highly 
contested (see Head, 2019, for an overview). Wicked problems have included climate change 
and global warming at the international level, but tackling poverty or providing integrated 
youth care also fits the description, and such challenges cannot be tackled by single 
governments or within the public realm alone. They require engagement of actors in the 
private realm as well, such as third-sector organizations (Brandsen & Johnston, 2018). Global 
pandemics like COVID-19 are another example of a wicked problem that is currently high on 
the agenda. From a resource dependency perspective, this means that there are increased 
interdependencies between public, private nonprofit, and private business actors to tackle 
important policy issues and to provide high-quality integrated services. CG then is part of the 
range of concepts and perspectives that are all dealing with the challenge of identifying, 
connecting, and/or jointly developing solutions to wicked problems. There is a growing 
literature that speaks of “collaborative innovation,” regarding innovation as a key objective of 
collaboration (Sørensen & Torfing, 2011; Torfing, 2019).
Second, another trend that fuels the push for collaborative solutions is fiscal stress. While the 
ideological context in which New Public Management arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was also in part budgetary (i.e., putting the alleged fat state on a diet), in the last decade, 
since the global financial crisis, the mantra of savings and cutbacks has been sounding more 
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forceful than ever, leading to a push for a leaner government and resulting in organizational 
decline of public departments and agencies in many countries. In such a context, public 
organizations need to strategize and to think about their core tasks, while at the same time 
look for ways to access resources outside government to achieve those tasks. While cutback 
management might lead to a decline, rather than increase, in collaborative efforts (i.e., 
because collaborative efforts may be considered a luxury one cannot afford any longer), 
ultimately, collaborative paths are likely to re-emerge because of political and societal 
necessity, as in the case of any public–private partnerships for infrastructure development 
that are collaborative responses to resource scarcity (Bovaird, 2004; Brinkerhoff & 
Brinkerhoff, 2011). In current collaboration, this focus seems to be expanding, also resulting 
from co-creation and co-production with citizens and societal groups for an increasingly wide 
range of issues (Brandsen et al., 2018).
Interestingly, economists talk in similar terms: from the age of competition, over the age of 
cooperation, to the current age of collaboration (Snow, 2015). Essentially, in this age, 
organizations that survive or even thrive in the marketplace or civil society are the 
organizations that opt for strategies of collaboration with a wide range of other partners 
(Daft, 2013).
Some claim that the rise of CG fits a new paradigm, such as new public governance (Osborne, 
2006), network governance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Koliba et al., 2019), and collaborative 
public management (Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Bingham & O’Leary, 2008), or even claim that 
it is a new paradigm in itself (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015). In the 
Handbook on Theories of Governance, edited by Ansell and Torfing in 2016, “collaborative 
governance” is listed as a “form of governance,” next to regulatory governance, network 
governance, multilevel governance, metagovernance, adaptive governance, and other forms. 
To distinguish it from network governance, Keast (2016, p. 447) considered CG a “higher- 
order form of network governance—one that moves beyond task integration to the synthesis 
of people and their resources for the broader good.”
Key Scientific Sources
As noted, much of the work underpinning CG did not use the term itself but drew on early 
literature on interorganizational relations and alliances, political economy, and networks. The 
wider literature is far beyond the scope of this article, so the article refers primarily to 
literature that has a direct line to current CG literature, keeping in mind the literature’s wider 
ancestry.
Many relevant books have been published over the past decades, including: Barbara Gray’s 
Collaborating: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems in 1989 and her recent 
sequel with Jill Purdy, Collaborating for Our Future: Multistakeholder Partnerships for Solving 
Complex Problems in 2018; Managing to Collaborate: The Theory and Practice of 
Collaborative Advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 2005); Collaborative Governance Regimes 
(Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015); Leadership for the Common Good: Tackling Public Problems in a 
Shared-Power World (Crosby & Bryson, 2005); Working Across Boundaries: Collaboration in 
the Public Services (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2007); two books on governance networks in the 
public sector (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016; Koliba et al., 2019); two books on collaborative public 
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management (Agranoff, 2012; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003); edited volumes like Big Ideas in 
Collaborative Public Management (edited by Bingham & O’Leary, 2008); Collaboration: Using 
Networks and Partnerships (edited by Kamensky & Burlin, 2004); Network Theory in the 
Public Sector (edited by Agranoff et al., 2014); Public Innovation through Collaboration and 
Design (edited by Ansell & Torfing, 2014); and Networks and Collaboration in the Public 
Sector: Essential Research Approaches, Methodologies and Analytic Tools (edited by Voets et 
al., 2019).
A good start for exploring the CG concept is the article by Ansell and Gash titled 
“Collaborative Governance in Theory and Practice” (2008), in which the authors developed a 
contingency model of CG. Another is the article by Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh titled “An 
Integrative Framework for Collaborative Governance” (2012) and the elaboration in the book 
Collaborative Governance Regimes in 2015. A third is the article “Designing and 
Implementing Cross-Sector Collaborations: Needed and Challenging” by Bryson et al. (2015). 
These three sources provide a good starting point for listing the main components, insights, 
and challenges of CG.
All three central theoretical and analytical frameworks focus on the importance of individuals 
working closely to establish common norms based on relative degrees of trust and mutuality. 
These frameworks also take a systems perspective on CG, identifying those structures, 
functions, and processes common to the development of CG.
Conceptualization 1: Ansell and Gash
Ansell and Gash (2008) defined CG as “a governing arrangement where one or more public 
agencies directly engage nonstate stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is 
formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy 
or [to] manage public programs or assets” (p. 544). They stressed that their definition aimed 
to be sufficiently restrictive to counter the critique of fuzziness that often persists around 
considerations of governance in general and to allow for theory-building. From their 
definition, it is clear that public organizations act as instigators for the collaboration (and 
hence are still in a way “in the lead” and have a special responsibility), and that it is not 
merely a matter of collaboration between public organizations but needs to bridge the public– 
private divide. They also asserted that there needs to be an actual joint decision-making 
process across or between organizations across all sectoral divides (as opposed to traditional 
consultation processes) in which all actors seek to find a consensus. This consensus-driven 
process requires some level of established formal or reified status (so it is not just an informal 
platform or deal-making in back rooms). The other key feature of CG is that it must seek to 
achieve public policy or public management (pp. 544–545). Gray and Purdy (2018) considered 
CG a specific, more formal form of multisector partnership in which government is involved, 
as opposed to less formal types, such as round tables, dialogues, and transnational networks. 
Although authors like Ansell and Gash tried to ensure that CG has a particular definition to 
differentiate it from other multi-actor arrangements, their definition of CG still has much in 
common with participatory management, network governance, interactive policymaking, 
stakeholder governance, collaborative public management, and alliance public–private 
partnerships (Edelenbos & Teisman, 2008; Gray & Purdy, 2018; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016) and 
is therefore still subject to critiques of fuzzy definition.
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Bevir, who has written and edited key volumes on governance, considered CG more broadly to 
be about “attempts to create and conduct policy that involve the participation of 
nongovernmental and nontraditional political actors. … Collaborative governance is an 
interactive process in which myriad actors with various interests, perspectives, and 
knowledge are brought together” (Bevir, 2009, p. 47). Key aspects, then, are the inclusion of 
nontraditional actors (not the classic iron triangles studied and criticized in the 1980s for 
being undemocratic and lacking transparency), the explicit presence of citizens and citizen 
groups in such processes, and the fact that it is—or should be—about negotiation starting 
from the premise that everyone should have a say (whatever their institutional or power base) 
rather than traditional consultation in a democratic process. It is clear that the main elements 
that Bevir put forward are also present in the definition by Ansell and Gash, whose framework 
is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1. The Ansell and Gash model of collaborative governance.
Source: Ansell and Gash (2008, p. 550).
The Ansell and Gash framework is systemic, in the sense that it pays attention to the starting 
context of a collaborative arrangement, it is heavily focused on the actual process within that 
arrangement and the dynamics it generates, and it pays separate attention to facilitative 
leadership and institutional design as well as ultimately to the output from the process.
By listing starting conditions, this framework reasserts that collaboration does not come about 
in a void: it concerns actors who often have asymmetries in terms of resources (including 
knowledge) and power (thus linking to a key foundation of collaborative and network 
research, namely resource dependency theory; see Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016, for an overview). 
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The actors experience incentives and constraints to collaborate, and their joint history of 
either cooperation or conflict already defines the initial level of trust. The collaborative 
process itself is a cycle of dialogue, negotiations, trust, commitment, shared understanding, 
and evaluation that can lead to “intermediate outcomes” that lay the foundation for societal 
outcomes in the end. Thus, Ansell and Gash joined together main insights on trust and mutual 
gains that have been developed in the past decades in the literature and tried to demonstrate 
how they connect and influence one another. Two main components that are important to 
understand or to make the collaboration work are institutional design and facilitative 
leadership. Therefore, Ansell and Gash demonstrated that collaboration does not simply 
“happen” but requires proper design (e.g., defining ground rules, the position of the 
collaboration, and its membership) and that it requires leadership that can be exerted by 
various actors to make the collaboration work (compare this to the management of strategic 
and institutional complexity defined by Klijn and Koppenjan [2016]). Ultimately, a successful 
collaborative process should result in outcomes that address societal issues at hand.
The strength of the Ansell and Gash model is that it follows a systems logic model of inputs, 
processes, and outputs but also builds on a systematic literature review of 137 cases; in doing 
so, it tries to build a common architecture for future collaborative research and practice.
Ansell and Gash explicitly referred to CG as a strategy or mode of governance (2008), as a 
proactive policy instrument (2018), and also as a contingency theory that draws heavily on 
empirical studies to construct an analytical framework that should be helpful to practitioners 
who want to set up, or are engaged in, collaborative arrangements. While a lot has been 
written on why CG is important, what challenges it brings, and what solutions might come 
from it, “the imperatives for effective collaboration are easy to state but difficult to 
accomplish” (Donahue & Zeckhauser, 2011, p. 60). The work of scholars like Ansell and Gash 
tries to deal with this gap.
When considering what conditions best suit collaboration, Gash (2016) found that all CG 
settings:
need to be problem-driven to identify and address policy shortfalls,
entail networks of partners with various interests, and diversity among them needs to be 
high enough to creative substantive variety,
require an authority and autonomy to discuss, to decide, and to act upon the issues it is 
dealing with; and
ideally, aim to promote shared learning and consensus-building.
This list reasserts the input-process-output nature of CG. Problem definitions and solution- 
oriented incentives help to set the initial conditions for collaboration. Collaborative processes 
are structured through networks of organizations and individuals (Koliba et al., 2019). The 
actors are guided by formal and informal norms (including trust, dialogue protocols, and 
transparent decision-making). Ideally, the process is guided by, and through, shared learning 
and democratic norms.
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Conceptualization 2: Emerson and Nabatchi
While Ansell and Gash tried to be somewhat limitative in their definition, Emerson and 
Nabatchi (2015) expanded the definition to capture more actors, structures, and processes. 
For Emerson and Nabatchi, then, CG refers to “the processes and structures of public policy 
decision-making and management that engage people across the boundaries of public 
agencies, levels of government, and/or the public, private, and civic spheres to carry out a 
public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished” (p. 18). Emerson and Nabatchi 
drew on this broad definition to join various theoretical, normative, and empirical 
perspectives and to develop the concept of collaborative governance regimes (CGRs) as the 
core of their framework. A CGR is “a particular mode of, or system for, public decision making 
in which cross-boundary collaboration represents the prevailing pattern of behavior and 
activity” (Emerson et al., 2012, p. 6). Their use of terms like “regime” and “system” makes it 
clear that they want to stress that there needs to be a sufficient level of stability and 
formalization in which a real joint commitment to the goals and the process is essential (Gray 
& Purdy, 2018). For Emerson and Nabatchi, the “integrative” character of their framework 
means drawing on new institutionalism, social network studies, the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993), the study of negotiations, and performance 
literature (figure 2).
Figure 2. The integrative framework for collaborative governance.
Source: Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). Collaborative governance and collaborative governance regimes. In Collaborative 
governance regimes (p. 27). Copyright 2015 by Georgetown University Press. Reprinted with permission. press.georgetown.edu.
There are three things to be noted in relation to the Emerson and Nabatchi model: it opens for 
informal CG, it creates a new link to public value/purpose, and it refers indirectly to 
collaborative advantage. It is clear that the framework is dynamic, starting from the system 
context and drivers in which a collaborative regime is situated and develops, looking at the 
interaction process within the regime labeled collaboration dynamics, and paying attention to 
the actions, outcomes, and ultimately adaptions that come out of it.
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The dynamic nature of the CGR allows for the inclusion of additional systems-level properties 
(Meadows, 2008), namely a clear sense of temporality, some loose allusions to feedback 
relationships, and a recognition of broader system context or exogenous factors. The model 
also takes into consideration the role that feedback regarding outcomes can play (in best-case 
scenarios) in informing regime learning and adaptation.
Effective CG begins with what Emerson and Nabatchi described as “principled engagement” 
for involving key stakeholders. As the stakeholders engage, common or shared goals emerge. 
Definitions of performance goals and objectives are said to follow. A process of deliberation 
leads to a set of decisions (or determinations) that lead to action. This process mirrors what 
John Goodlad and others have noted as the “cycle of inquiry,” which is a process of dialogue, 
decision-making, action, and evaluation (Goodlad et al., 2004). If the process of establishing 
common ground and a shared purpose is successful, this in turn fuels a cycle of “shared 
motivation” to make the collaboration work, requiring commitment, trust, mutual 
understanding, and establishing internal legitimacy (Gajda & Koliba, 2007). Their third cycle, 
“capacity for joint action,” refers to the foundational idea of CG that collaboration should help 
to do things that each actor separately cannot achieve. By developing procedural and 
institutional arrangements, leadership, resources, and knowledge, the collaboration is 
strengthened, both fueling the cycles of principled engagement and shared motivation and 
jointly leading to meaningful actions (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).
The key premise of CGR theory lies in the notion that forms of strong engagement “will 
produce determinations that are fairer and more durable, robust, and efficacious” (Emerson & 
Nabatchi, 2015, p. 63). Emerson and Nabatchi recognized that many collaborative 
arrangements call for the intentional use of institutional design (p. 69) and the utilization of 
resources (p. 73). Emerson and Nabatchi laid out a typology of CGRs that includes self- 
initiated, independently convened, and externally directed CGRs (2015, p. 163). This typology 
provides a useful indicator for where, and how, to define one or more locus of control in both 
the initiation and the implementation phases of collaborative activities.
A major critique of the CGR model is that it places heavy emphasis on the motivations to 
establish CG arrangements. The model’s internal dynamics also place a heavy emphasis on 
idealized conditions, consensus-like deliberations, and some level of common agreement 
around norms.
Both the Ansell and Gash approach and the Emerson and Nabatchi approach to CG tend to 
place an emphasis on idealized collaborative processes and dynamics. They do not take into 
account the inherent “messiness” of practice. They do not account for the possibility and 
inherent likelihood of power and informational asymmetries, nor do they present a strong 
foundation regarding the role that institutional rules play in governing interorganizational 
relations.
Conceptualization 3: Bryson, Crosby, and Middleton Stone
The work of Bryson, Crosby, and Middleton Stone is a third important source for an overview 
of CG. In contrast to Ansell and Gash and Emerson and Nabatchi, Bryson and colleagues (201 
5) provided an overview of the major theoretical frameworks and empirical findings between 
2006 and 2015. In doing so, they brought in their 2006 framework to study what they referred 
to as cross-sectoral collaboration (see Bryson et al., 2006).
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1.
2.
With a strong grounding in sustained empirical observations of cross-sector collaborations, 
the Bryson, Crosby, and Middleton Stone framework took into consideration the common 
realities of power and authority by emphasizing the potential for conflict and tension, and the 
important role that accountability plays. Their model of CG echoed components found in the 
work of Ansell and Gash or Emerson and Nabatchi. First, they also brought to light the 
important general antecedent conditions that can provide incentives or that can help to reveal 
if collaboration is the best approach. Second, Bryson, Crosby, and Middleton Stone also took a 
dynamic view. They started with the importance of defining initial conditions, drivers, and 
linking mechanisms to get the collaboration going. Next, they pointed out key process and 
structuration challenges to making the collaboration work, and they stressed the important of 
leadership, governance, and capacity and competences to do so, but they also pointed to the 
importance of conflicts and tensions that can stem from power imbalances, different logics, 
and the like. Finally, they also put the focus on the final component, in terms of outcomes, but 
broadened this point to accountability questions. Their explicit focus on conflicts and tensions 
as well as the issue of accountability for (the lack of) outcomes can be considered two main 
“new” conceptual components.
Bryson et al. (2015) also added to the literature by defining both propositions that allow 
better theory development by scholars and key points needed by practitioners who engage in 
CG that serve as important indicators of what practitioners must be aware of. The 
propositions were deduced from literature reviews and extensive empirical studies of cross- 
sector collaborations. The propositions, which are organized along the main components of 
Bryson et al.’s synthesizing framework, are most likely of great use to practitioners and serve 
as an effective bridge between CG as theory and making collaboration work in practice. 
Regarding initial conditions, Bryson et al. stated, among other things, that collaboration is 
likely to develop in turbulent environments (see the impact of COVID-19 as an extreme 
illustration of that point) and linking mechanisms (like powerful sponsors, policy tools, or 
project calls requiring collaboration) increase chances of success. In regard to designing 
effective processes, they posited that the latter includes establishing legitimacy with internal 
and external stakeholders and finding the right mix of deliberate and emergent planning. In 
terms of structuring the collaboration, propositions include the need to manage temporal, 
spatial, and structural ambidexterity. Collaborating in a turbulent environment also requires 
active management of contingencies and constraints, leading to propositions that consciously 
prepare for windows of opportunity, power issues, and shocks; such propositions increase 
chances for success. A final set of propositions deals with the need to manage outcomes and 
accountabilities, including the “warning” that achieving success in collaborative 
arrangements is very difficult and one should always be aware of that beforehand. 
Furthermore, smart results management and reporting systems and accountability loops with 
relevant political and professional forums also increase chances of success (Bryson et al., 
2015, p. 17).
Synthesizing CG as a Model
Drawing on the three main sources of CG as a model then implies:
It is necessary to identify, be aware of, and deal with conditions that a collaboration 
could start from, as well as the broader context in which it is situated.
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It is important to invest in and to organize the intentional interaction processes among 
the actors involved.
Structuring and institutionalizing the collaboration in a smart and effective way is 
critical to success.
Awareness of process and structure require active and smart management strategies 
and leadership roles.
It is important to be aware of downsides, risks, and constraints in step 4.
It is important to tackle the crucial question and to pay attention to what finally comes 
out of the collaborative arrangement.
It is also important to address critical accountability and democratic legitimacy issues.
These components are not simply a staged, causal chain, but an iterative and complex 
interacting setting.
Pitfalls and Conceptual Gaps in CG Theory
Several limitations of, and pitfalls in, CG theories and frameworks deserve to be mentioned 
here. The first potential pitfall is making collaboration the preferred standard mode of tackling 
public-policy and service-delivery issues (Gash, 2016). To some, it might appear that CG will 
save the world, and to some extent those who have advanced CG theory have held onto the 
idea that CG is an inherent good. It should be clear, however, that it only “works” in the 
pursuit of the public good under certain conditions and that it often requires sufficient 
investment in the long-term interaction process to get results (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). CG 
should be explored to tackle wicked issues, while hierarchy and market are more likely 
strategies to deal with issues requiring authority and standardized, efficient service delivery 
(Torfing et al., 2012).
An increasing amount of research is demonstrating collaborative failure rather than 
collaborative success. Smart metagovernance, facilitative leadership, and network 
management can help to limit or even counter collaborative failure to a certain extent, but 
they are not miracle solutions (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). But even if conditions do seem right 
for collaboration, good design and management of the network is imperative. While there are 
many efforts by researchers to contribute to practice in this respect (many CG scholars are in 
fact action-researchers—see, for instance, Huxham and Vangen), it is remarkable how much 
still needs to be learned by public organizations in this respect. The pitfall of pursuing 
collaboration in all cases and contexts is also related to the risk of abusing this mode of 
governance to push political and organizational responsibilities away (“the working group 
syndrome”). If it is a delicate matter and politicians and public managers are not willing to 
take difficult decisions, declaring “that collaboration is needed to address the issue” becomes 
a convenient way out, buying time and providing an opportunity for blame-shifting if the CG 
network fails. CG should not ignore the importance of power and politics (Torfing et al., 2012).
A second pitfall is that collaborative arrangements can be weak on monitoring and evaluation. 
Often, collaborative networks fail to draw up indicators, only monitor progress informally, and 
have no clear evaluation strategy or culture. It is crucial to avoid the pitfalls of performance 
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management, and a clear monitoring and evaluation strategy can help the network to adapt as 
necessary (Boland & Fowler, 2000; Bryson et al., 2015; Frederickson & Frederickson, 2006; 
Koliba et al., 2019; O’Leary et al., 2015; Silvia, 2018).
A third pitfall is that CG networks “avoid,” willingly or unwillingly, the challenges of 
accountability and legitimacy, or do not thoroughly consider how to organize for this. In this 
context, the literature on network accountability (Koliba et al., 2011, 2019; Mashaw, 2006; 
Newman, 2004) is useful, as is the governance network literature pertaining to democratic 
anchorage (Sørensen & Torfing, 2005). But if CG networks are really dealing with important 
public issues, they need to ensure that they give account not only to their organizations, but 
also to society at large. This implies that they can be held to account for collaborative 
outcomes (or the lack thereof) and that they ensure legitimacy through a transparent and 
sufficiently open process, etc. (Voets et al., 2008). While some might argue that ensuring 
accountability and legitimacy is in the DNA of CG, the risk of going back to iron triangles and 
closed policy networks can be real. The challenge for scholars then is not only to bring 
legitimacy and accountability into the models or frameworks, but also to critically apply them 
(Klijn & Skelcher, 2007).
A fourth pitfall is insufficient attention to the need for collaborative capacity, which is often 
lacking in practice. In times of fiscal stress, investing sufficient resources in a CG network 
proves even more difficult. However, the fact that people “sit around the table” is often not 
enough to solve the challenges they are expected to tackle. Often, CG networks are 
underorganized, and building up a sufficiently strong collaborative capacity seems impossible, 
despite motivated participants, a dedicated manager, etc. Even if the relational capacity is 
achieved, it is not enough to tackle the actual challenges being discussed. This pitfall is also 
related to the first one: if governments are more selective in setting up collaborative 
arrangements, they can invest more in those that are the most promising and that deal with 
real policy priorities.
Limitations of CG Theory and Models
With the pitfalls in mind, there are several gaps in CG theory that require further 
examination. The first gap is the need for a fuller integration of CG into network governance 
theory. Network governance structures include three ideal types: shared governance 
modalities, third-party network administration, and lead organization modalities (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008). Although the three ideal types of network governance structure call on some 
amount of trust and decision-making protocols, they do account for the possibility, particularly 
in the lead organization structure, for power and authority differentiation. The lead 
organization structure may imply, or at least allow for, a possibility that is recognized by CG 
theory, but that is not necessarily fully accounted for: the possibility of mandated 
collaboration in which participants do not enter into the collaboration voluntarily, and the 
possibility that some CG arrangement may actually contain more traditional bureaucratic or 
hierarchical ties. The growing consensus in the network governance literature around the 
prevalence of “mixed tie” networks speaks to this point (Koliba et al., 2019). Within the 
context of network governance theory and frameworks, collaboration is understood as one 
(but likely very important and effective) tool for addressing public policy issues. In some 
instances, mandates and regulation, as well as incentives, may be used to forge network ties. 
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Although these arrangements are much more challenging to study, they are likely to be more 
common. Because networks are ubiquitous (Barabasi, 2016) and a foundational structure of 
social systems, more effort is needed to integrate CG processes, regimes, and dynamics into 
certain network structures.
A second major consideration for CG theory is the matter of institutional rules. Consideration 
of this matter cannot fail to refer to Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom’s work on the governance 
of common pool resources (1990, 2005). CG theory can benefit from a stronger link to 
Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development Framework, which includes action situations 
and action arenas, as well as an acknowledgment that any form of CG unfolds within 
environments shaped by operational, process, and often constitutional rule structures. The 
effects of institutional rules place serious constraints on any collaborator’s engagement in 
CGRs, as the existence of shared norms around principled engagement and trust may be 
overwritten by legal, bureaucratic, or procedural standards. It should be noted that these 
standards impact not only the dynamics of interorganizational networks themselves, but also 
the actions of individual actors (be they construed at the organizational or individual levels). 
While current CG models do refer to the institutional level, they can be explored more in 
depth, as is currently the case.
CG in the Future?
While CG research already has provided many valuable insights and has reached a level of 
maturity as scholars develop integrated models, this does not mean that researchers are now 
of a single mind or have stopped developing CG research further.
One key question gaining importance is the relationship between CG and performance. Ansell 
and Gash (2008) set out to address the question whether CG is more effective than adversarial 
or managerial governance. They found that “very few of the [137] studies [we] reviewed 
actually evaluated governance outcomes” (p. 549). This is a criticism that is still valid: What 
has the call for collaboration delivered in terms of tackling the issues that such collaborations 
are set up for? Calls for strong hierarchical leadership may be seen as an indication that CG is 
considered either undesirable or ineffective. Therefore, more studies of CG performance are 
needed. A recent edited volume by Voet et al. (2019) discussed the relationship of methods to 
theories of collaboration and networks. The methods enable the study of collaborations as 
dynamic and complex processes (Koliba et al., 2016).
A related question concerns the impact of, and reasons for, collaborative failure. Because the 
discourse on collaboration is increasingly popular, and as more governments, nonprofits, and 
businesses take a collaborative path, the question of collaborative failure is important to 
address. There are enough warning signs that collaboration is not easy and has substantial 
transaction costs—and Huxham and Vangen (2005) essentially said “Don’t do it unless you 
have to”—but it seems that many public organizations, policymakers, and administrators 
apply it as a “standard format solution” for any issue. But what are the pitfalls if governments 
engage in collaboration without sufficient preparatory thinking about the design and 
consequences of this path? The intentional development of cross-sector collaboration has 
Page 14 of 21
Printed from Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Politics. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a 
single article for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 02 June 2021
become an important tool in the policymaker’s and public manager’s toolbox (see, for 
instance, the collective impact literature; Kania & Kramer, 2011). More empirical work and 
theoretical testing of such tools are needed (Keast et al., 2020).
This is also a matter of transparency, accountability, and legitimacy, and ultimately a matter of 
the relationship between CG and democracy. This raises the question: If too many 
collaborative efforts fail, who is held accountable, and what then is the alternative strategy? Is 
the solution to “bring the state back in,” strengthening hierarchical governance? Does the 
failure of CG lead to a stronger role for markets? Gray and Purdy (2018), for instance, argued 
that one should be careful to consider other governance modes, such as dealing with common 
pool resource issues (Ostrom, 1990, 2007), which might be more successful than CG 
networks. It seems, however, that decisions about the desired governance mode (assuming 
that the governance mode is more likely to result in the desired outcomes) are often not 
reflected upon by many governments. More insight into the process of metagovernance— 
considered here as the informed choice to opt for hierarchy, market, or network or a mix of 
governance styles (Sørensen, 2006)—is warranted (Meuleman, 2018).
Another related question is capacity-building and collaborative capacity. While many CG 
scholars aspire to develop insights and to create knowledge that can benefit practitioners, the 
step from providing interesting analytical frameworks and formulating relevant 
recommendations to actually contributing to collaborative success remains challenging. Being 
able to collaborate requires specific skills of participants and of those taking up leadership or 
management roles (see O’Leary et al., 2012, for five sets of skills). What is the impact of 
training program and learning experiences on the capacity of individuals? (For example, what 
is to be learned from the collaborative case database of Syracuse University?) And how does 
all this translate into a genuine working culture? Collaboration is a human enterprise by its 
very nature, and it is important to take into account the broader capacity for collaboration and 
to link it to the way managers try to manage and control their separate organizations: What is 
required and feasible in this respect? What are the “resource levels” that might be identified 
up front to ensure collaborative capacity is likely to be sufficient to help achieve outcomes?
An important question is whether CG is likely to continue to converge into one model and 
theory, or whether models will continue to develop alongside one another. The similarities 
across the three major CG frameworks highlighted here offer promise. A challenge is the 
extent to which the various CG frameworks are likely to be developed further and will be (or 
will continue to be) tested empirically. The comments about network governance and 
institutional rules are particularly relevant here. Paraphrasing the first methodological 
challenge identified by Bryson et al. (2015): There is a risk of having strong theorizing on the 
one hand and interesting empirical and action-oriented research on the other hand, and they 
both need to be connected more strongly in the future.
Fortunately, new and interesting work is being done. For example, work is demonstrating how 
structural characteristics of CG networks influence advocacy of stakeholders (Mosley & Jarpe, 
2019), what types of structural designs help to improve collaborations (Bryson et al., 2019), 
how actively working with performance information can help collaboration move forward 
(Douglas & Ansell, 2020), how to better deal with paradoxes during collaboration 
(Waardenburg et al., 2020), and how CG theory can be developed further by linking it to 
existing theories (Koebele, 2018). Other relevant studies include the work by Cepiku et al. 
(2020) demonstrating that different configurations of causal conditions lead to high or poor 
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collaborative performance, work by Warsen et al. (2019) demonstrating which combination of 
contractual and relations conditions results in success, and work on how the network 
characteristics of the network structure combine with individual leadership to achieve 
performance (Cristofoli et al., 2021). CG topics have been expanded in work focusing on the 
way CG can lead to innovation (Torfing & Ansell, 2017) and exploring the understudied role of 
politicians as boundary spanners between CG and representative democracy (Sørensen et al., 
2020), and CG topics have been revisited, as in the work on the relation between core CG 
concepts like trust and power (Ran & Qi, 2019). But the extent to which it is possible to 
expand into a grand model of CG—which is perhaps a utopian or even an undesirable idea— 
remains to be seen. Interestingly, both methodological convergence and methodological 
innovation may prove to be links in the expanding CG field between researchers and research 
and practice (Keast et al., 2020).
Added Value of CG for Students and Researchers
CG brings added value to students and researchers in different ways. First, CG attempts to 
grasp, connect, and explain the complexities associated with dealing with wicked issues in the 
public sector. In doing so, CG draws on different literatures and theories, providing students 
and researchers interested in studying and grasping much of contemporary public action with 
a particularly good basis to start from. Rather than having to go through the history of all the 
literature strands and theories supporting the CG theory and models, students and 
researchers can start directly with applying, operationalizing, or amending the theory and 
models to fit their research needs.
Second, another added value linked to the synthesizing qualities is the holistic nature of CG, 
which not only tries to capture what goes on within governance arrangements, but also 
connects to the broader institutional and systems context. While that holistic nature, 
connecting different levels of analysis and the interplay among them, might be challenging, it 
can help students and researchers to avoid tunnel vision or a narrow focus and to develop an 
authentic “situational awareness” of systems properties (Endsely, 1995).
Third, CG is relevant for students and researchers in other fields (such as environmental 
management, urban studies, planning, social work, and health care) that have their own 
substantive frames, issues, challenges, theories, and methods. CG offers a sufficiently 
“generic” framework to connect, complement, and support that knowledge, and it might even 
prove to be a useful metaframework in studying and tackling governance challenges in other 
fields.
So, despite CG’s pitfalls, its limitations, and the questions about the future of CG, CG is now 
part of the ever-expanding canon of contemporary theories and models in public 
administration and management.
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